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BRAZIL V. ARGENTINA: DIFFERENT
RESPONSES TO THE RISING FOOD
COMMODITIES MARKET
David Gibson*
RAZIL and Argentina have always been rivals in just about every
category. From football to social policies, the two countries com-
pete to try to be the most dominant in South America, despite
their similar backgrounds. Both countries are world leaders in agricul-
ture, most significantly in soy beans and grain. The World Bank has esti-
mated that food prices have risen on average by eighty-three percent
since 2005.1 These high prices in recent years have prompted both coun-
tries to try to capitalize on this market upswing through their agricultural
sectors. The influence of these factors, combined with a need to increase
economic growth and fund social programs have led to a large amount of
policy reform and new governmental actions by both countries. But their
government's actions in trying to accomplish these goals have been mark-
edly different and have produced drastically different results.
I. BRAZIL'S AGRICULTURAL BACKGROUND
Brazil, through its economic background, laid a foundation of liberal
economic policies designed to maximize production. In the late 1980s,
Brazil began to move toward a more laissez-faire and free market ori-
ented policy for its economy, which has had a major impact on its agricul-
tural sector. 2 The result of these changes is that the agricultural gross
product for the country from the beginning of this policy-shift to present
has more than doubled.3 Further, agricultural exports rose from thirteen
billion dollars in 1990, to over thirty-two billion dollars in 2005, making it
the world's third largest exporter of agricultural products. 4 By 2004, the
agricultural sector of Brazil's economy generated 183 billion dollars,
roughly thirty percent of the country's GDP, employing thirty-five per-
cent of the work-force, and accounting for forty percent of the year's total
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exports from Brazil. 5 Therefore, agriculture plays a major role in the
livelihoods of many Brazilians, and its economy deeply depends on this
sector.
There have been significant constraints, however, on this attempted de-
velopment in the past. These constraints include trade barriers and gov-
ernment initiated subsidies by competing nations to their domestic
producers and exporters. 6 Past exchange rate instability, a considerable
amount of confusion in defining property rights to land, and a relatively
poor infrastructure caused logistical bottlenecks that limited the effi-
ciency of the movement of products from the producers to market. 7
The government of Brazil, starting with the Cardoso administration,
fought these constraints by shifting priorities in agricultural policy to land
reform in an effort to increase production and employ more of Brazil's
available work force. 8 Under Cardoso, 500,000 new family farms were
created on land that had been prepared for cultivation under Cardoso's
agrarian government spending programs. 9 Further, under the program
known as PRONAF, the government tried to help these family farmers
by subsidizing credit lines, supporting new building projects, and by in-
creasing agricultural research in an effort to boost the productivity of
these farms. 10 Brazil's spending on agrarian re-organization programs
had enlarged to forty-five percent of total expenditures by the time of the
Lula administration.11 For instance, spending on land reform increased
from "R$1.84 billion in 2000, to R$2.4 billion in 2004" and expenditures
on support of family farming under PRONAF went from "R$1.4 billion
to R$2.8 billion" during this same time frame. 12 Farming techniques also
changed dramatically through the research and employment of modern
planting practices that were encouraged through the rise in Brazil of
larger agricultural operations. 13
These economic reforms were aimed at reducing domestic taxes, export
taxes, and restrictions on agricultural exports to try and promote a more
free market system.14 The government also reduced a large amount of
the state's interference with agricultural markets by privatizing state agri-
cultural businesses. 15 This was primarily achieved through the Real Eco-
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Constanza Valdez, Brazil's Booming Agriculture Faces Obstacles, AMBER WAVES,
Nov. 2006, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/November06/Fea-
tures/Brazil.htm.
8. Rex A. Hudson, Brazil: A Country Study, Agriculture, WASHINGTON: GPO FOR
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (1997), available at http://countrystudies.us/brazil/
71.htm.
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nomic Stabilization Plan. 16 This economic plan also had the goal of trying
to reduce inflation, and it was able to do this by around five percent per
year through implementing a floating exchange rate.1 7 Reduced inflation
caused the currency to depreciate, but it also resulted in lower supply cost
for agricultural products. This low cost, combined with new opening mar-
kets created by the privatization of many agricultural businesses, created
a major stimulus in many agricultural sectors, most notably in soybean
production. 18
These policies since the 1980s resulted in an increase in the average
laborer's income, a reduction in Brazil's poverty level, and a major in-
crease in food consumption by the average Brazilian.1 9 Most impor-
tantly, these policies laid the foundation for more recent governmental
policies. These policies are now designed to take advantage of the
world's increasingly larger and more expensive food commodities market
by trying to further increase production, further combat poverty, further
increase Brazilian's wages, and decrease unemployment levels.
II. BRAZIL'S RESPONSE
Since 2000, the value of Brazilian agricultural exports has grown at an
average rate of 20 percent per year. 20 Brazil, in response to the current
rise in the prices offered for agricultural products on the international
food commodities market, has attempted to increase production and in-
crease global competitiveness in an attempt to try and increase their ex-
port levels.2' Brazil implemented laws that increased the amount of
credit available to farmers, and has continued the shift from the tradi-
tional economic model that it followed before the Cardoso administration
to a more global industrial model for its agriculture. 22 The increase in
capital has led to more direct investment by large agricultural companies
in Brazil.23 This has displaced many domestic and foreign competitors
and increased agricultural industry concentration. 24 But this has also
eliminated many medium and small agricultural companies in Brazil.25
The agricultural production in Brazil, through these recent policy shifts, is
also modernizing and becoming increasingly capital intensive, which has
led to the need for more available credit.26 Further, the need for inte-




19. Marcus Vinicius Pratini De Moraes, Livestock and Food Supply of the Federal Re-
public of Brazil, World Food Summit, 1996, http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/
Y4172M/rep2/brazil.htm.
20. Valdez, supra note 7.
21. Id.
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large agricultural operations has created new industries and new jobs as-
sociated with agricultural supply.27 Soaring demand and foreign invest-
ment in the form of investment capital from countries such as China and
India has also helped boost Brazil's export growth through the rise of
these large agricultural companies.28
The government, in an attempt to maximize this growth and capitalize
on the increased demand; has set preferential credit to the agricultural
sector; implemented many tax exemptions to businesses in the agricul-
tural sector; financed agricultural research, marketing, and infrastructure
improvements; and has implemented a large amount of federal, state, and
local subsidies.29 This has resulted in expanded resources and capital for
agricultural production, making it easier to expand production by increas-
ing the amount of area that is being used for agriculture, and making the
land that is being used already to produce more. 30 Also, the government
has implemented a record amount of farm credits in 2008 (a form of indi-
rect subsidy) to try and further promote an increase in production while
the price of exports is still high.3 1 In addition, the government has also
implemented a new R$49 billion credit line for farmers both large and
small, up twelve percent from the 2007 total.32 This credit line should
allow farmers to have more resources to buy necessary supplies and
equipment to promote production. Most of this credit also comes with
reduced interests rates and longer payoff periods than in previous years.33
Further, wages in Brazil have not risen sharply but remained on a steady
slow climb; the money supply, through the above stated efforts, has ex-
panded by seventeen percent, opening up even more available capital to
farmers by keeping their cost of operations low. 34
The increased export and sale of these agricultural products has di-
rectly led to increased rural investments and has generated income and
rural jobs that seem to be on a sustainable basis.3 5 In 2008, the soy bean
harvest set a record for Brazil, and another record harvest is also ex-
pected for corn, which is being grown in the same fields.3 6 Agricultural





31. Andrew Downie, Two Approaches to Exploiting Higher Food Prices, INT'L HER-
ALD TRIB., Aug. 27, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/27/busi-
ness/farm.php (on file with author if the NY Times who has bought out IHT does
not end up adding this file to the new database).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Byron Wein, Weep for Argentina; Cheer for Brazil (Pequot Capital Management,
Inc, August 2008), available at www.newyorkhedgefundroundtable.org/documents/
BW%20August%202008.pdf (on file with author).
35. De Moraes, supra note 19.
36. Thomas Omestad, Brazil's Rising Food Power in a Hungry World, U.S. NEWS, May
8, 2008, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/05/08/brazils-
rising-food-power-in-a-hungry-world.html.
BRAZIL V. ARGENTINA
mately seventeen percent more than 2007. 3 7 The Real has risen twenty-
five percent against the U.S. dollar since 2007, and Brazilian stocks have
been on a steady rise since 2003 with only a few severe corrections. 38 This
economic growth and large amount of agricultural production at a time
when food prices on the international commodities market are high must
be attributed to the policies implemented by Brazil's government.
Brazil's future outlook is very promising despite the recent global re-
cession. Brazil is already the number one exporter in the world for beef,
chicken, soy, sugar, orange juice, and coffee, and these products' produc-
tion levels should continue to increase through these policies imple-
mented by the government. 39 In addition, there are still over 220 million
unused acres of land in Brazil available for farming. 40 This has made
investors more optimistic about Brazil than in the past due to its huge
potential for increased production. 4 1 Further, Brazil is a major consumer
and producer of ethanol, and as the worlds demand for alternative fuels
rises despite the recent drop in oil and gas prices, so does the demand for
Brazilian agricultural products. 42
But there are some constraints that could have the potential to slow
Brazil's agricultural growth in the future. First, the current level of in-
debtedness by farmers in Brazil could constrain the amount of credit
available in the future. 43 Also, the amount of credit that will become
available, due to recent financial collapses and turmoil, will most likely
have a much higher interest rate than before, despite the government
subsidies available. 44 Additionally, due to the indebtedness of the farm-
ers, any subsequent loans will be considered a higher risk than the previ-
ous loans, making these loans potentially less available.45 Second, land
expansion will most likely slow as the expansion begins to creep more
into the Amazon and Cerrados.46 International environmental concerns
combined with technological difficulties in growing in these areas will
most likely hamper the ability to sustain the recent large amount of ex-
pansion in the agricultural sector.47 Third, Brazil's development of its
infrastructure and transportation network will most likely not be able to
keep up with this recent rapid expansion of the agricultural sector.48
Therefore, there will most likely be bottlenecks surrounding the transpor-
tation of getting these products to international markets, creating the po-
37. Flvia Albuquerque, Better Wages in Food Industry in Brazil Grow 21% this Year,
BRAZIL MAGAZINE, Aug. 18, 2008, available at http://www.brazzilmag.com/con-
tent/view/9780/.
38. Wein, supra note 34.
39. Omestad, supra note 36.
40. Downie, supra note 31.
41. Wein, supra note 34.
42. Id.




47. Omestad, supra note 36.
48. Id.
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tential for dead loss and slowing growth.49 Fourth, fluctuations in fuel and
fertilizer prices due to the increased demand for these products as a result
of varying oil and gas prices will also decrease the amount of capital avail-
able to farmers for expansion. 50
Despite these drawbacks, Brazil remains in a position for continued
growth and an increase in production for its already formidable agricul-
tural sector. This growth, as marked already by the record harvests of soy
and predicted record harvest for corn, will enable Brazil to take in a large
amount of taxes, thus further enabling it to fund other sectors and priori-
ties of its government. Therefore, Brazil has put itself in a position to
maximize its agricultural output and cash in on the ever increasingly
global food commodities market. This in turn, should lead to increased
revenues for the government, more jobs for the Brazilian people, and less
poverty.
III. ARGENTINA'S AGRICULTURAL BACKGROUND
Argentina, in contrast, has taken very different steps in response to the
rising global food commodities market. These steps are partially a result
of the economic and agricultural background of Argentina. Since the
1970s oil shock, Argentina has gone through numerous periods of eco-
nomic crisis and government coups. In addition, the failed invasion of the
Falkland Islands also had a major impact on the country's economy, most
notably in its GDP. From 1981-1982 the GDP shrank by twelve percent
through a marked economic crisis.51 Further, the Central Bank of Argen-
tina implemented a policy known as "Circular 1050", which tied adjusta-
ble loan rates to the relative value of the US Dollar.52 This caused
interest rates to rise sharply during this period and directly led to a drop
in fixed investment in Argentina through foreign countries by forty per-
cent.53 Later policies by the elected democratic government helped cre-
ate a twenty billion dollar trade surplus, but tax evasion and the further
loss of foreign investment capital during this period forced the Central
Bank to print money to cover Argentina's foreign debt.54 In addition, the
United States recalled a $350 million loan package that also sent the Ar-
gentine Austral into a sharp decline in value.55 From 1975-1988, inflation
averaged over 200 percent per year and peaked at 5000 percent in 1989.56
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. David Rock, Racking Argentina, NEW LEFT REVIEW, Sept. 7, 2002, at 10, available
at http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=2410.
52. Id.
53. The Statistical Abstract of Latin America, University of California, Los Angeles,








To fight this crisis, the Argentine government shifted policies toward
more trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, similar to its
Brazilian rivals. In an effort to bring in more foreign trade and increase
the level of foreign investment, the government privatized most of the
state-controlled businesses. 57 Inflation fell significantly in the early 1990s
and the GDP grew at an average of 5.5 percent between 1990 and 1998.58
But the strengthening of the currency markets in Argentina led to a boom
in imports as their price on averaged dropped and again left a large trade
deficit of twenty-two billion dollars by 1999.59 This trade deficit coupled
with further tax evasion created a large amount of debt for Argentina,
and in 2001, it officially defaulted on ninety-three billion dollars of its
debt.60
This economic turmoil has not had as much of an effect on the agricul-
tural sector as would be expected with this kind of market and currency
uncertainty. Argentina's agricultural exports accounted for twenty per-
cent of their total exports in 2007, but-fifty-five percent of its total ex-
ports are agricultural in origin.6 1 In 2007, its agriculture accounted for 9.4
percent of the GDP, producing 1515.8 million metric tons of agricultural
products. 62 Further, throughout this period since the 1970s, Argentina
has maintained its spot as one of the world's top four exporters of soy-
beans, corn, wheat, and beef.63 It is also a major producer of grains.64
Therefore, Argentina has a very strong agricultural background, similar
to that of Brazil's, with the capacity to produce many crops, most notably
the ability to produce a large amount of wheat and soybeans.
But the policy background of its government has been very different
from that of Brazil with Argentina looking more towards taxing its agri-
cultural sector in order to either float other economic sectors that are
failing or to fund social programs in an effort to reduce poverty. In addi-
tion, Argentina is sharply contrasted with Brazil by the lack of policies
designed to promote agriculture. This could be attributed to the rela-
tively little available land for expanding farm sizes in Argentina, as com-
pared against Brazil, but is most likely the result of a lack of available
funds for these types of programs due to the above stated financial
turmoil.
57. Carlos Augusto Maranhfo, Brazilian Foreign Trade and its Role in International
Competitiveness, Institute of Brazilian Issues, The George Washington University,
1998, available at http://www.gwu.edu/-ibi/minerva/Fall1998/Carlos.Maranhao.
html.





63. Nicholas Kuznetz, Senate Knocks Down Argentine Leader on Grain Tax, Associ-
ATED PRESS, July 17, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com!International/
wireStory?id=5394815.
64. Argentine Senate Rejects Farm Tax, BBC NEws, July 17, 2008, available at http://
newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7511111.
stm. (Argentine Senate Rejects Farm Tax).
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IV. ARGENTINA'S RESPONSE
With this background in mind, Argentina's response to the rising food
commodities market is not surprising. With the recent rise of China and
India, and their increasing demand for agricultural products, there has
been a great opportunity for Argentina to cash in on the commodities
market by producing more. But instead of embarking on a path to pro-
mote farming production growth, the Argentine Government has imple-
mented various tax schemes. These new, increased taxes had the
opposite effect of Brazil's policies, and have actually created an antago-
nistic relationship between the farmers of Argentina and their
government.
In March of 2002, the Argentine Economy Minister announced a ten
percent tax on primary agricultural exports and a five percent tax on
processed agricultural products before the food commodities market be-
gan to rise.65 These new taxes were on top of already existing export
taxes including a 3.5 percent export tax for soybeans. 66 For oilseeds, one
of Argentina's most notable secondary agricultural exports, the taxes in-
creased overall export taxes on soybeans and sunflower seed to 13.5 per-
cent.67 Many attributed these taxes to be in response to the default of
Argentina's debt in 2001.68 The government, however, stated that these
export taxes were put in place to temporarily create funding for its social
programs. But they have not yet been abolished.69 In addition to these
export taxes, which now hover around thirty-five percent, the govern-
ment implemented a policy of retention of these food products by artifi-
cially setting the price of food products to keep them affordable. 70
In March of 2008, President Cristina Fernandez increased taxes again
on farmers by decree. 71 These new taxes increased export taxes on soy,
sunflower, and grains by more than ten percent.72 The new taxes also
changed the fixed rate import tax on agricultural products to a floating
export tax that rises as global food prices rise.73 The tax on soy alone
increased to more than-forty-four percent under this tax scheme. 74
Under this tax system, as the price of this crop increases, the tax on the
65. Paul Provance, Argentina: Changing Policies Increases Uncertainty for Soybean and






70. Maxilliano Borches, Argentina: It's Time to Stop the Aggressions, Safe Democracy
Foundation, July 3, 2008, http://english.safe-democracy.org/2008/07/03/argentina-
its-time-to-stop-the-aggressions/.
71. Kuznet, supra note 63.
72. Id.
73. Alexi Barrieonuevo, Argentina Blocks Farm Export Tax, LATIN AMERICAN POST,





President Fernandez explained that these taxes are an attempt to keep
Argentine foods cheap for the Argentine people by making them expen-
sive abroad and forcing farmers to sell to local markets first.76 Further,
her government said that because farmers are making more on their
products, they could afford to pay more.77 This in turn would keep the
price low for agricultural products in local markets and combat rising in-
flation. 78 However, many of her critics said that these taxes were put in
place to fund higher spending for social programs, most notably to try
and create more energy subsidies. 79
In addition to the taxes, farmers will now have to officially register
their total product capacity for the year under this policy. 80 The farmers
will then be authorized to export twenty-five percent of that amount; the
rest will have to go to the domestic market.81 Of the thirty million metric
tons of grain already declared for export under this new policy in 2008,
twenty four million tons of it had not been previously purchased and
would have to bear the higher tax rate.82
These tax measures reduced farmers' incentive to produce more crops
due to uncertainty in the price of their products because of these export
taxes. 83 In addition, rising costs for farming supplies such as fertilizer
combined with lower prices of their products at market significantly low-
ered most Argentine farmers' profit margins.84 Therefore, going into the
recent period of high prices for food commodities, Argentina has done
little historically to try and increase their production in order to capitalize
on this market. This further led to a heightened state of antagonism be-
tween the government and the nation's farmers even before the recent
food commodities price increase. 85 This sudden increase in taxes
prompted farmers all over the country, in both cities and rural areas, to
take four month long protest measures. 86 In Palermo alone, more than
230,000 people attended a pro-farmer rally.87 Farmers also went on strike
and set up roadblocks to prevent trucks, loaded with farm goods, to get to
75. Argentina Export Tax Clears a Hurdle, Market Watch, http://www.marketwatch.
com/story/argentinas-new-crop-exporttax-cleared-lower-house.
76. Kusnetz, supra note 63.
77. Argentine Senate Rejects Farm Tax, supra note 75.
78. Kusnetz, supra note 63.
79. Argentine Leader Backs Down, Drops Farm Tax, FRANCE 24 INT'L NEWS, July 19,
2008, available at http://www.france24.com/en/20080719-argentine-leader-repeals-
drops-farm-tax-argentina-soy-tax. (Argentine Leader Backs Down).
80. Shane Romig, Argentina's Farming Conflict Cools, but Continues to Simmer, Dow




83. Provance, supra note 65.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Kusnetz, supra note 63.
87. Barrieonuevo, supra note 73.
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market.88 In addition, as a partial result of this turmoil, President Fer-
nandez's popularity plummeted by twenty percent in June of 2008
alone.89
These tax hikes have had such a negative response that the Argentine
Senate, despite having a majority with Fernandez's party, formally re-
jected the new measure on July 18 of 2008. 90 After almost eighteen hours
of debate, the Senate voted thirty seven to thirty six, with the Vice-Presi-
dent as the deciding vote, against the floating-rate export tax system put
in place by President Fernandez which was originally imposed without
consulting Congress.91 However, the country is still deeply divided over
the measures as evidenced by a 100,000 strong pro-government rally
outside of Congress on the day of the Senate vote. 92 These supporters
and the pro-Fernandez Senators have taken the position that higher taxes
for farmers are needed to redistribute income from the windfall that
farmers had received through the increase in food prices.93
Despite the repeal of the floating-rate agricultural tax policies, a large
amount of antagonism still remains between the farmers and the Argen-
tine government. Argentine Rural Society Vice President Hugo Biolcati
stated that despite the repeal "the policies haven't changed" and that
there has not been a change in attitude despite changing officials.94
Farmers still oppose the existing fixed level of export taxes on their prod-
ucts as being too oppressive because it distorts the agricultural market
and leads to decreased production.95 The government, despite the recent
tax repeal, still defends the existing fixed export tax rate as necessary to
ensure domestic supply and to shield the Argentine people from rising
global food prices.96
Through these taxes and the turmoil associated with it, it seems as if
Argentina is losing a historic opportunity to cash in on its significant agri-
cultural presence in the global market. Instead of trying to capitalize on
increased demand for agricultural products and agricultural production,
Argentina has simply taxed them more as the global food prices rise and
actually limited their farmers exposure to the international marketplace.
The soy market in Argentina, Argentina's top crop, significantly stalled
due to the temporary tax increase and the protests surrounding it.97 Fur-
ther, the relatively high amount of export tax imposed on these products,
as compared with Brazil, combined with lower local prices leave farmers
with little to reinvest. 98 This also increases the amount of financial risk
88. Kusnetz, supra note 63.
89. Id.
90. Argentine Leader Backs Down, supra note 79.
91. Barrieonuevo, supra note 73.
92. Id.




97. Kusnetz, supra note 63.
98. Id.
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associated with farming because uncertainty in the level of export prices
created by the recent financial crisis could mean a lack of profit for
farmers. 99
An economic atmosphere of low profit margins, high risk of invest-
ment, and an unstable labor force due to recent protests does not make a
good investment opportunity. With these factors present alongside a
global recession, large foreign investment in Argentina's agricultural sec-
tor does not seem likely. In addition, with the historic lack of agricultural
programs or investment by the Argentine Government, farmers seem to
be left with little available capital to try and increase production. There-
fore, Argentina has not put itself in a position to maximize the amount of
benefit that it could receive through its agricultural production on the
booming global food commodities market.
V. MODERN TRENDS
Brazil took very aggressive steps to try and accomplish its goal of cash-
ing in on the rising global commodities market. It extended a large
amount of new credit to its farmers allowing them to invest more back
into their farms or to invest into increasing the size of their farms and
cope with rising farming supplies cost. In addition, increases in govern-
ment spending on programs geared toward research and development
also helped Brazilian farmers increase production by implementing mod-
ern technologies and techniques for farming. Further, the privatization of
almost all agricultural business in Brazil combined with a steady currency
rate and cheap labor promoted the growth of large agricultural compa-
nies in Brazil and dramatically increased the level of foreign investment
in Brazilian agriculture. These factors, combined with a large amount of
available space for expanding agricultural operations in Brazil bode well
for its future production levels.
Argentina took very different steps in an effort to bring in more reve-
nue surrounding the high prices offered on the global food commodities
market. Instead of implementing programs or increasing investment in
agriculture as Brazil did, Argentina levied increasingly large amounts of
export taxes on its agricultural products. The most recent being those
implemented by President Fernandez based on a floating export tax rate
designed to force farmers to sell to local markets first in an effort to keep
food prices and inflation in Argentina low and to fund other social
projects. These efforts are founded in the hope of spreading wealth and
reducing poverty. But this new tax caused massive protests, significantly
stalled the agricultural market and had the effect of increasing inflation.
These taxes were later rejected by the Argentine Senate but a large
amount of antagonism remains between the government and the farmers.
Further, a high amount of fixed export taxes still remains.
99. Provance, supra note 65.
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These taxes on exports, combined with the rising price of fuel and
farming supplies such as fertilizer, are decreasing the profit margins of
farmers in Argentina. Further, volatility in local markets for agricultural
prices due to subsidies and the risk of even more export taxes increases
the economic risk for farmers in planting their crops. In addition, politi-
cal turmoil, an all too present factor in Argentina's history, is again com-
ing to the surface surrounding the large protests against these taxes. This
does not create a good investment opportunity for foreign companies and
Argentine farmers are left stranded with an inadequate amount of capi-
tal. Therefore, Argentine farmers have little opportunity or incentive to
increase their production despite the high prices being offered for agricul-
tural products on the global food commodities market.
VI. SUMMARY
In today's global economic world, and its dynamic state, a country must
take every opportunity it has to try and open up new markets for its citi-
zens and promote its already established economy. Brazil and Argentina,
both countries with a large agricultural base in their economies, stand to
benefit from the world's rising food commodities market. This market,
partially driven by China and India's emergence on the world markets
and the increased demand on everything associated with them, does not
seem to be slowing anytime soon despite the global recession. China still
stands to have sustained growth of six percent in 2009.100 Both countries
can significantly benefit from this by attempting to increase their agricul-
tural production to satisfy this increase in demand. Only time will tell if
Argentina can grow to their potential as Brazil seems to be on its way to
doing so.
100. Alan Wheatley, UPDATE: 1-OECD sees China growth at 6-7 pct in 2009,
REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2009, available at http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/03/20/
afx6192277.html.
